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1 Introduction
In the security market analysis, we usuahy assume that each trade of buying or sehing does not
affect the stock price. However, there are some kind of institutional traders cahed “large traders”
who affect the market price through their own large trades, and the price change incurred by the
large traders is referred to as “price impact.”
Large traders must recognize these price impacts as “liquidity risk” and construct the execution
strategy considering the liquidity risk. The field of “optimal execution problem considering liquidity
risk,” is a hot topic in recent years among many academic researchers or practitioners, in particular
after the financial crisis of 2007‐2008.
The pioneering work in this field was done by Bertsimas and Lo (1998) [2]. They discussed the
optimization problem of minimizing the expected execution cost in a discrete‐time framework via
a dynamic programming approach, and showed that it is optimal to equal the execution volume
throughout the trading epochs. However, their model does not take into account any risks. There‐
fore, Almgren and Chriss (2000) [1] derive the optimal execution strategy considering both the
execution cost and the volatility risk. They also incorporate the idea of efficient frontier into their
analysis. As for Kuno and Ohnishi (2015) [5] and Kuno, Ohnishi, and Shimizu (2017) [6], they con‐
struct models with the residual effect of the price impact, solve optimization problem of maximizing
the expected utility payoff from the final wealth, and lead to optimal execution strategies.
As a trend of the previous papers including those mentioned above, many researchers focus on
the behavior of the institutional traders. Moreover, they suppose that there is no price impact of
the traders other than the large traders. We call such traders as trading crowd as Huberman and
Stanzl (2004) [3]. In addition, they did not consider any model with a number of large traders in
spite of the fact that there are many large traders in the real market.
The purpose of this article is to obtain the optimal execution strategy of maximizing the expected
utility payoff from the large trader’s final wealth, which is the same approach with those introduced
in [5] and [6].
2 Price Impact Model with Non‐Large Traders’ Effects
In this model, we assume there is one large trader (for example, a life insurance company or a
trust company) in a discrete‐time framework t=1 , . . . . T, T+1 . Then. the large trader is going to
purchase Q volumc of one risky asset by the time T+1 (\in \mathbb{Z}+:=\{1,2, . . Wc also suppose that





We assume that q_{l} represents the large amount of orders submitted by the large trader at time t
(=1, \ldots, T) . Then, \overline{Q}_{t} is the number of shares remained to purchase by the large trader at time t
(=1, \ldots, T, T+1) . From this assumption, \overline{Q}_{1}=Q and
\overline{Q}_{t+1}=\overline{Q}_{t}-q $\iota$, t=1 , . . . , T (1)
is satisfied.
Thc market price (or quotation pricc) of thc risky asset at time t is represented by p_{t} . Because
the large trader submit large amount of orders, the execution price become not p_{t} , but \hat{p}_{t} with
the additive execution cost. In the fohowing, we denote $\lambda$_{t} as the price impact per share occurred
by the large trader and $\kappa$_{t} as the one by the trading crowd. Then, a sequence of independent
random variables v_{t} fohows the normal distribution with the mean $\mu$_{v_{t}} and the variance $\sigma$_{v_{t}}^{2} , that
is, v_{t}\sim N($\mu$_{v_{t}}, $\sigma$_{v_{t}}^{2}) , which represents the cxecution volume of trading crowd at time t.
From the assumption above, we set the execution price in the form of the linear price impact
model as fohow:
\hat{p}_{t}=p_{t}+($\lambda$_{tq_{t}+}$\kappa$_{t}v_{t}) , t=1 , . . . , T . (2)
With the detcrministic price reversion rate $\alpha$_{t} (\in [0,1]) and the resilience speed  $\rho$(\in [0, \infty we
define the residual effect of past pricc impact as follows:
 r_{t+1}=\displaystyle \sum_{k=1}^{t}($\lambda$_{k}q_{k}+$\kappa$_{k}v_{k})$\alpha$_{k}\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$((t+1)-k)}=[r_{t}+($\lambda$_{t}q_{t}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})$\alpha$_{t}]\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$}, t=1 , . . . , T . (3)
Some public news or information of the economic situation have an impact on the price.
Therefore, we define independent random variable $\varepsilon$_{t} (t = 1, \ldots, T) as the effect of the public
news/information about economic situation between t and t+1 , and assume $\varepsilon$_{t} fohows the normal
distribution with the mean $\mu$_{$\epsilon$_{l}} and the variance $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}}^{2} , that is, $\varepsilon$_{t}\sim N($\mu$_{$\epsilon$_{t}}, $\sigma$_{$\epsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}}^{2}) . We suppose that the
two stochastic process, v_{t} (t=1, \ldots, T) and $\varepsilon$_{t} (t=1, \ldots, T) , are mutually independent. However,
we can derive the similar results without this assumption (that is, if they fohow a bivariate normal
distribution).
The definition of $\epsilon$_{t} gives rise to the fundamental price p_{ $\iota$}^{f} :=p_{t}-r_{t} as fohows:
p_{t+1}^{f}=p_{t+1} -r_{t+1}=p_{t}^{f}+($\lambda$_{t}q_{t}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})(1-$\alpha$_{t})+$\varepsilon$_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T. (4)
From (2) , (3) and (4), the execution price is calculated as
p_{t+1}=p_{t}-(1-\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$})r_{t}+($\lambda$_{tqt}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})\{$\alpha$_{t}\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$}+(1-\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$})\}+$\varepsilon$_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T. (5)
In this context, ($\lambda$_{t}q_{t}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})(1-$\alpha$_{t}) , ($\lambda$_{t}q_{t}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})$\alpha$_{t} and ($\lambda$_{t}q_{t}+$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})$\alpha$_{t}\mathrm{e}^{- $\rho$} represents the par‐
manent impact, the temporary impact, and the transient impact respectively. Moreover, if  $\rho$\rightarrow\infty,
the model is attributed to the parmanent impact model, and if $\alpha$_{t}= 1 , the model is attributed to
the transient impact model. Also, if $\kappa$_{t}=0 or $\sigma$_{v_{t}} =0 , the model is attributed to [6].
Finahy, the wealth process w_{t} is
w_{t+1} =w_{t}-\hat{p}_{t}q_{t}=w_{t}-\{p_{t}+($\lambda$_{tq_{t}+}$\kappa$_{t}v_{t})\}q_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T . (6)
2.2 Formulation as a Markov Decision Process
In this subsection, we formulate the large trader’s problem as a discrete‐time Markov decision
process. The time horizon is finite, 1, . . . , T, T+1 . The state of the process at time t\in\{1 , . . . , T, T+
1\} is a 4‐tuple, and is denoted as s_{t} = (w_{t}, \overline{Q}_{t},p_{t}, r_{t}) \in \mathbb{R}^{4} = : S . Also, for t \in \{1, . . . , T\} , an
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ahowable action chosen at state s_{t} is an execution volume q_{t} \in \mathbb{R} = : A so that the set A of
admissible actions is independent of the current sate \mathrm{s}_{t}.
When an action q_{t} is chosen in a state s_{t} at time  t\in \{1, . . . , T\} , a transition to a next state s_{t+1} =
(w_{t+1}, \overline{Q}_{t+1}, p_{t+1}, r_{t+1}) \in S occurs according to thc law of motion precisely described in thc previous
subsection which is symbolicahy denoted by a system dynamics function h_{t} : \mathrm{S}\times \mathrm{A}\times(\mathbb{R}\times \mathbb{R})\rightarrow \mathrm{S} :
s_{t+1}=h_{t}(s_{t}, q_{t}, (v_{t}, $\varepsilon$_{t} t=1, \ldots, T. (7)
A utility payoff (or reward) arises only in a terminal state s_{T+1} at the end of horizon T+1 as
r_{T+1}(s_{T+1}):=\{ -\infty-\exp\{-Rw_{T+1}\} \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}_{T+1}^{\overline{\frac{Q}{Q}}}\neq 0\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}_{T+1}=0 ; (8)
which means a hard constraint enforcing the large trader to execute ah of the remaining volume
\overline{Q}_{T} at the maturity T , that is, q $\tau$=\overline{Q}_{T}.
If we define \mathrm{a} (history‐independent) one‐stage decision rule f_{t} at time  t\in \{1, . . . , T\} by a map
from a state s_{t} \in S=\mathbb{R}^{4} to an action q_{t} =f_{t}(s_{t}) \in A=\mathbb{R} , then a Markov execution strategy  $\pi$ is
defined as a sequence of one‐stage decision rules  $\pi$ :=(f\mathrm{l}, . . . , ft, . . . , f_{T}) . We denote the set of all
Markov execution strategies as $\Pi$_{M} . Further, for  t\in \{1, . . . , T\} , we define the sub execution strategy
after time t of a Markov execution strategy  $\pi$=(f\mathrm{l}, . . . , ft, . . . , f_{T})\in $\Pi$ as  $\pi$_{t} :=(ft, . . . , f_{T}) , and
the entire set of $\pi$_{t} as $\Pi$_{M,t}.
By definition (8), the value function under an execution strategy  $\pi$ becomes an expected utility
payoff arising from the terminal wealth  w_{T+1} of the large trader with the absolute risk aversion R :
V_{1}^{ $\pi$}[s_{1}]=\mathbb{E}_{1}^{ $\pi$}[r_{T+1}(s_{T+1})|s_{1}]=\mathbb{E}_{1}^{ $\pi$}[-\exp\{-Rw_{T+1}\}\cdot 1_{\{\overline{Q}_{T+1}=0\}}+(-\infty)\cdot 1_{\{\overline{Q}_{T+\mathrm{J}}\neq 0\}}|s_{1}] , (9)
where. for  t\in \{1, . . . , T\}, \mathbb{E}_{t}^{ $\pi$} is a conditional expectation given s_{t} at time t under  $\pi$.
Then. for t\in\{1, . . . , T\} and s_{t} \in \mathrm{S} , we further let
V_{t}^{ $\pi$}[s_{t}]=\mathbb{E}_{t}^{ $\pi$}[r_{T+1}(s_{T+1})|s_{t}]=\mathbb{E}_{t}^{ $\pi$}[-\exp\{-Rw_{T+1}\}\cdot 1_{\{\overline{Q}_{T+1}=0\}}+(-\infty)\cdot 1_{\{\overline{Q}_{T+1}\neq 0\}}|s_{t}] (10)
be the expected utility payoff at time t under the strategy  $\pi$ . It is noted that the expected utility
payoff  V_{t}^{ $\pi$}[s_{t}] depends on the Markov execution policy  $\pi$=(f\mathrm{l}, . . . , ft, . . . , f_{T}) only through the sub
execution policy $\pi$_{t} :=(ft, . . . , f_{T}) after time t.
Now, we define the optimal value function as follows:
V_{t}[s_{t}]=\displaystyle \sup_{ $\pi$\in$\Pi$_{M}}V_{ $\iota$}^{ $\pi$}[s_{t}], s_{t}\in \mathrm{S}, t=1 , . . . , T. (11)
From the principle of optimality, the optimality equation (Bellman Equation, or dynamic pro‐
gramming equation) becomes
V_{t}[s_{t}]=\displaystyle \sup_{q_{t}\in \mathrm{R}}\mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}[h_{t}(s_{t}, q_{t}, v_{t}, $\varepsilon$_{t})]s_{t}], s_{t}\in \mathrm{S}, t=1 , . . . , T. (12)
3 Optimal Execution Strategy
The optimal dynamic execution strategy  $\pi$ is acquired by solving the above equation (12) backwardly
on time  t from maturity.
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal Execution Strategy and Optimal Value Function) The optimal ex‐
ecution volume at time t , denoted by q_{t}^{*} , becomes the affine function of the remianing execution
volume \overline{Q}_{t} and the cumulative residual effect r_{t} at time t . That is,
q_{t}^{*}=f_{t}(s_{t})=a_{t}+b_{t}\overline{Q}_{t}+c_{t}r_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T . (13)
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Moreover, the optimal value function V_{t}(s_{t}) at time t (=1, \ldots, T) is represented as follow:
V_{t}[s_{t}]=-\exp\{-R[w_{t}-p_{t}\overline{Q}_{t}-G_{ $\iota$}\overline{Q}_{t}^{2}-H_{t}\overline{Q}_{t}+I_{t}\overline{Q}_{t}r_{t}+J_{t}r_{t}^{2}+L_{t}r_{t}+Z_{t} (14)
Where a_{t}, b_{t}, c_{t};G_{t}, H_{t}, I_{t}, J_{t}, L_{t}, Z_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T are deterministic functions dependent on the prob‐
lem parameters, and can be computed backwardly in time t.
From the theorem above, the optimal execution volume q_{t}^{*} depends on the state \mathrm{s}_{t}=(w_{t}, p_{t}, \overline{Q}_{t}, r_{t})
of the decision process only through the remianing execution volume \overline{Q}_{t} and the cumulative residual
effect r_{t} , not through the wealth w_{t} or market price p_{t} . Furthermore , if the orders of the trading
crowds are deterministic, then optimal dynamic execution strategy is in a class of the static (and
non‐randomized) execution strategy.
4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we ihustrate some numerical examples and show some properties of the optimal
execution strategies defned abovc. The maturity is T= 10 , and the large trader plans to execute
the volume Q=100000 within a time period T at thc beginning. We assumc thc timc homogeneity
of the time‐dependent parameter $\mu$_{v_{\mathrm{t}}}, $\sigma$_{v_{\mathrm{t}}}, $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}}, $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}}, $\alpha$_{t}, $\lambda$_{t}, $\kappa$_{t} for simplicity. To obtain the explicit
form of the optimal execution volume, we assume that the price impact of the trading crowd is
deterministic, i.e. $\sigma$_{v_{\mathrm{t}}} = 0, t = 1 , . . . , T . We set the benchmark as $\mu$_{v_{t}} \equiv  2.0, $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}} \equiv  1.0, $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}} \equiv
 0.02, $\alpha$_{t}\equiv 0.5, $\lambda$_{t}\equiv 0.001, $\kappa$_{t}\equiv 0.005,  $\rho$=0.1, R=0.001.
4.1 Possibility of Weak Arbitrage
In this subsection, we consider about a possibility of a gain from a round trip trading. For a sequence
q :=(q\mathrm{l}, . . . , q_{T}) \in \mathbb{R}^{T} , a static (and non‐randomized) execution strategy  $\pi$ =(f\mathrm{l}, . . . , f_{T}) \in $\Pi$_{M}
defined by f_{t}(s_{t}) = q_{t} for any \mathrm{s}_{t} \in  S=\mathbb{R} is cahed a round trip trading schedule if it satisfies the
condition \displaystyle \sum_{t=1}^{T}q_{t}=0 . In particular, zero‐trade schedule is the (trivial) round trip trading schedule
defined by 0= (0, \ldots , 0) .
According to [3], an opportunity of an arbitrage in a weak sense is a round trip trading schedule
( $\pi$=) q if
\displaystyle \mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[w_{T+1}|s_{1}]-w_{1}=\mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[w_{T+1}-w_{1}|s_{1}]=\mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[-\sum_{t=1}^{T}\hat{p}_{t}q_{t}|\mathrm{s}_{1}] >0 (15)
where \hat{p}_{t}, t=1 , . . . , T is the execution price defined in Section 2.
If the initial execution volume \overline{Q}_{1} =Q=0 , the zero‐trade schedule ( $\pi$=) 0 obviously satisfies
the hard terminal constraint \overline{Q}_{T+1} = 0 and results in a final wealth w_{T+1} = w_{1} with certainty.
Therefore, an opportunity q of an arbitrage in a weak sense does strictly better than the zero‐trade
schedule 0 with respect to the risk‐neutral criterion. Furthermore, with respect to our expected
utility criterion, if we have V_{1}^{0}[s_{1}] < V_{1}^{q}[s_{1}] for some round trip trading schedule q , then, by
Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
‐ \exp\{-Rw_{1}\}=V_{1}^{0}[\mathrm{s}_{1}] <V_{1}^{q}[s_{1}]=\mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[-\exp\{-Rw_{T+1}\}|\mathrm{s}_{1}] \leq-\exp\{-R\mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[w_{T+1}|s_{1}]\} , (16)
which implies w_{1} <\mathbb{E}_{1}^{q}[w_{T+1}|\mathrm{s}_{1}] , that is, q is also an arbitrage in a weak sense.
In the fohowing, we show three cases of the trades where the large trader execute a round trip
trade, i.e., \overline{Q}_{1}=\overline{Q}_{T+1}=0 : $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}}=1, $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}}=0, $\mu$_{$\epsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}}=-1
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Figure 1. Remaining Execution Volume \overline{Q}_{t} and Execution Volume q_{t} (t=1, \ldots, T)
From these graphs, we find that, in the cases $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}} \neq  0 , the large trader is able to increase the
expected utility of the final wealth by starting from \overline{Q}_{1} =0 . Therefore, if $\mu$_{$\varepsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}} \neq 0 , then there exist
round trip trades which satisfy an arbitrage in a weak sense.
4.2 Comparative Statics
4.2.1 The Effect of Risk Aversion
First, we show the following three cases: R=0.001, R=0.5 , and R=1.
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Figure 2. Remaining Execution Volume \overline{Q}_{t} and Execution Volume q_{t} (t=1_{i}\ldots, T)
As these graphs show, the more risk averse the large trader is, the faster he or she executcs.
That is because the morc risk‐averse trader tends to avoid the price risk as possible.
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4.2.2 The Effect of $\alpha$_{t}
Next, we see the execution volume of the three cases: $\alpha$_{t}=0.01, $\alpha$_{t}=0.5 , and $\alpha$_{t}=1.
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Figure 3. Remaining Execution Volume \overline{Q}_{t} and Execution Volume q_{t} (t=1, \ldots, T)
These graphs illustrate that the faster the price reverses, the more the large trader tends to
execute at the beginning and at the end of the trading.
4.2.3 The Effect of $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}}
We show the three cases: $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{\mathrm{t}}} =0.02, $\sigma$_{\vee \mathrm{t}} =0.5 , and $\sigma$_{$\varepsilon$_{t}} =1.
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Figure 4. Remaining Execution Volume \overline{Q}_{t} and Execution Volume q_{t} (t=1, \ldots , T)
These graphs ihustrate that if the variance of the effect of the public news is large, the large trader
executes more faster for fear that the execution price will be pushed up by the public information.
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4.2.4 The Effect of the resilience speed
Finally, we demonstrate the three cases:  $\rho$=0.1,  $\rho$=0.5 , and  $\rho$=1.
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Figure 5. Remaining Execution Volume \overline{Q}_{t} and Execution Volume q_{t} (t=1, \ldots , T)
We can interpret from these graphs that as the resilience speed increase, the large trader executes
their order submit slowly.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this article, we derived the optimal execution strategy in the case of single‐large trader, and
showed some features of that strategy. However, we did not consider the situation where there
are other large traders. Hence, the study on the case of non‐single large trader model would be
remained for our future research.
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